This paper studies bidder behavior using a very detailed data set consisting of actual bid distributions in Norwegian Treasury bill auctions held during 1993-1998. The empirical results presented suggest that observed bidder behavior is consistent with an adjustment for the winner's curse/"champions plague". Bidders shade and disperse their bids more, and reduce quantity demanded, when the number of competing bidders increases. On average, large, medium-sized and small bidders earn the same profits per NOK purchased. However, there are some evidence that bidder behavior differs across bidder types. 
Introduction
Many countries use auctions on a regular basis to sell Treasury securities. The large quantities of Treasury securities issued have led to increased attention on the advantages and disadvantages of various auction formats. The debate has primarily focused on whether the discriminatory or the uniform price format yields the highest revenues to the Government, although it is also a concern that the auction should not favor any specific bidders. In discriminatory price auctions,
winning bidders pay what they bid, while in uniform price auctions, all bidders pay the same stop-out price.
Most of the theoretical arguments are based on the common value auction models since there typically is an active secondary market for Treasury securities. In the common value auction literature, private information on the common valuation gives rise to the winner's curse.
Many authors have argued that uniform price auctions generate higher expected revenues to the Treasury than discriminatory price auctions because they alleviate the winner's curse by linking the auction price to the lowest winning bid, or alternatively, to the highest loosing bid (e.g. Bikchandani and Huang, 1993; Friedman, 1991 ). This conclusion is based on results from single unit auction theory where the second price auction, in which the winning bidder pays the price bid by the second highest bidder, is revenue superior to the first price auction, in which the winning bidder pays his own bid price (Milgrom and Weber, 1982) . However, in Treasury auctions, bidders are allowed to submit multiple bids consisting of price and quantity pairs.
Literature on multiple unit common value auctions suggests that some, but not all, predictions from the single unit theory will hold in a multiple unit setting (e.g. Ausubel, 1997; Ausubel and Cramton, 1998) . Ausubel and Cramton (1998) show that the revenue ranking of the uniform and discriminatory auction formats are ambiguous. This paper employs a rich data set of discriminatory price Treasury bill (T-bill) auctions provided by the Norwegian central bank. The data set consists of actual bid distributions submitted by the bidders, auction awards and bidder identities for 68 auctions held during the period 1993 to 1998. Since the identities of the bidders are known, we can track each dealer through all auctions. In this paper, we make two different contributions.
First, we examine how bidders respond to an increased number of bidders. This is interesting because theories on multiple unit auctions have different predictions for bidding behavior with respect to an increased number of bidders. In particular we examine the winner's curse, which is more complex in multiple unit auctions than in auctions with only one object being sold. Ausubel (1997) refers to this as the "champions plague". The "champions plague" implies that a bidder's expected value conditional on winning more objects is less than his expected value conditional on winning fewer objects. The winner's curse/"champions plague" increases with the number of bidders. The explanation is that, the greater the number of competing bidders, the more upward biased are the highest signals. Bidders can respond to the increased winner's curse/"champions plague" by submitting lower demand schedules. Wang and Zender (1998) show in their model of multiple unit auctions that when there is no private information, risk averse bidders shade and disperse their bids less when the number of bidders is high. An increased number of bidders raises the expected stop-out price because there are more agents to bear the aggregate security risk. We test whether observed bid shading and bid dispersion can be explained by the winner's curse/"champions plague" or by risk aversion.
Second, our knowledge of bidder identities allow us to study individual bidding strategies.
Symmetry is an important underlying assumption in theories of multiple unit common value auctions. Hence, it is important to test whether this assumption holds empirically. In our sample, bidders are not symmetric with respect to quantity demanded or quantity awarded. This difference let us examine whether bidder size is important for the bidding strategy. Bikchandani and Huang (1993) argue that dealers may have private information from orders placed by institutional buyers such as pension funds and insurance companies. If private information exists, large bidders may have an advantage since they see more of the order flow. Due to the complexity of analyzing multiple unit auctions, there is a lack of theoretical models, which allow non-symmetry among bidders. 1 In our analysis, we test whether there are differences in bid shading and bid dispersion across different bidder types. We also examine whether bidder size is important in explaining bidder profits. Finally, we examine how different bidder types respond to the exogenous variables, uncertainty, auction size and the number of bidders.
Our results are consistent with findings in Nyborg et al. (2001) and Gordy (1999) . However, Nyborg et al. (2001) do not address the effect of an increased number of bidders, while Gordy (1999) only considers the effect of increased competition on bid dispersion. We find strong support for the winner's curse/"champions plague" because bidders respond to an increased number of bidders by bidding more conservatively. We find no significant differences in bid shading or bidder profits between large, medium sized and small bidders. However, regressions document that bidder behavior differs across bidder types.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description the institutional details of the Norwegian T-bill auctions. Section 3 describes the bidding data (subsection 3.1) and the secondary market data (subsection 3.2). In Section 4 we review theory on multiple unit auctions, and discuss the empirical implications. Section 5 presents our results, while Section 6 concludes.
The Norwegian Treasury bill auctions
In this section we describe the Norwegian T-bill auctions. In Norway, T-bills have been sold since 1985. T-bills were initially sold through dealers at face value. The T-bill market was regarded as an important tool for the monetary policy. Since July 1993, the Norwegian central bank has sold T-bills through auctions. The T-bills pay a coupon at maturity, and are defined as securities which mature within 12 months. The coupon is set close to the expected market rate when the T-bills are issued for the first time. 2 T-bills are sold through discriminatory price auctions. Each bidder is allowed to make any number sealed bids at different interest rates (separated by one yield basis point) and quantities, with a minimum of NOK one million per bid. If a bid is accepted, the bidder will receive the return to maturity stated in his bid. Bids at the highest accepted interest rate will be reduced of their informed competitors. Uninformed bidders are more likely to earn negative profits when their informed competitors abstain from bidding or underbid relative to winning bids. If uninformed bidders solely bid on the basis of public information, they earn zero expected profits, while informed bidders earn positive expected profits.
2 In October 2000, there were three major changes in the T-bill auctions. First, there was a change in the auction format. Second, bids can now be entered electronically, while bids previously were entered manually. Third, T-bills are now discount securities. Our data set consists entirely of auctions held prior to these changes. We thus describe the auctions before the changes.
proportionally if necessary. Non-competitive bids, which are quantity bids that always win and are (typically) sold at the quantity weighted winning bid yield, are not allowed in Norwegian T-bill auctions. The settlement in the auction is matched with settlement in the secondary market. T-bills are settled two work days after the auction. The central bank has the right to reject individual bids or all bids. In principle, the central bank can cancel an auction or reduce the amount awarded.
The bids are submitted by fax before 10.00 am on the auction day. The actual release time of the auction awards varies in our sample. The median release time is 11:30, while the actual release time varies between 11:00 am and 01:10 pm. The announcement includes information on the volume of bids, on the volume of bids awarded, and on the lowest, mean and highest interest rate accepted.
Only registered dealers at the Oslo Stock Exchange are allowed to submit bids in T-bill auctions. Investors who want to purchase T-bills in the auction, must bid through a dealer. The dealer simply passes the bid to the central bank. The investor does not pay any commission or spread to the dealer. The dealer is thus not paid directly for this service. Dealers have, however, told us that they regard knowledge about customer bids as valuable information. Table 1 shows a breakdown of auctions over time. Auctions are usually held on a monthly basis, although there are many exceptions. "Extra" auctions are typically held when there is a perceived need for withdrawing liquidity from the market. For instance, during January 1997 there were three "extra" auctions. The maturity of the auctioned T-bills varies. There is no fixed pattern such as in the US and Sweden, where T-bills with maturities of approximately 90, 180 and 360 days are auctioned on a regular basis. Table 1 also shows that 56% of the T-bill auctions are reopenings of existing securities. At the beginning of the sample period (July 1993 -October 1994) almost all auctioned T-bills were new issues (12 of 14 auctions). From November 1994, about two out of three auctions were reopenings.
The mean issue volume is NOK 4.1 billion, and ranges from 2 to 12 billion kroner. This average is approximate 6.5 percent, compared to the supply in a US Treasury auction (Sundaresan, 1994) . Compared to Sweden, the mean issue in Norway seems to be somewhat larger (Nyborg et al., 2001 ). However, auctions in Sweden and the US are more frequent than in Norway. The bid-to-cover ratio 3 averages 2.79, and ranges from 1.11 to 4.91. The average bid-to-cover ratio is 3 The bid-to-cover ratio is total demand in the auction divided by total amount offered. (T-bills), 1993-1998 Number of Year New Reopen  auctions  1993  6  0  6  1994  6  4  1 0  1995  5  7  1 2  1996  4  9  1 3  1997  6  1 1  1 7  1998  5  7  1 2  Total  32  38  70 lower than in the US, indicating less competition in the Norwegian T-bill market (Sundaresan, 1994 ), but is not very different from the average bid-to-cover ratio reported in Nyborg et al. (2001) for Swedish Treasury auctions. The lowest bid-to-cover ratio is 1.11 which means that no auctions have been undersubscribed. By comparison, Nyborg et al. (2001) report several incidences of undersubscribed auctions in Sweden. In Sweden there are also auctions where the Treasury has withdrawn securities from the auction after bids have been submitted. We find no evidence that supply has been reduced after bid submission in Norwegian T-bill auctions.
Data

Individual bid data
The data set is provided by the Norwegian central bank and consists of the complete set of individual bids. All participants in the auction can be identified. For each participant we have information on bid yields and quantities, and on awarded securities. The bid data is confidential and not available to market participants.
The data set contains all the bids from 68 T-bill auctions over the period July 1993 until December 1998. Data from two auctions are missing. The average face value per demand schedule is 830 million kroner. On average there are 5.6 bids per demand schedule. When a bidder submits many bids at a single yield, we have merged the bids. Most likely, the tendency to submit more than one bid at a single yield can be explained by customer bids. Instead of merging these bids, some dealers submit these bids separately. Even after merging bids at a single yield, some demand schedules contain very many bids, with a maximum of 35 bids. The average number of bidders is 13. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the number of bidders. The maximum number of bidders in an auction is 22, while the lowest number is 6. In Figure 2 , the number of auctions in which each bidder participated is plotted against the average purchase per auction measured in NOK million. Based on their market share measured by total purchases, we divide the bidders into three types. 
The Secondary market data
When estimating auction revenue and the degree of bid shading, we need a benchmark to measure against. Such a benchmark can be constructed from available secondary market data.
In Norway, T-bills are traded on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The best bid and ask quotes Purchase per auction in NOK million are available for customers on continuously updated electronic screens. Before January 2, 1998, these quotes were binding for a certain amount (usually between NOK 25 million and NOK 100 million). From January 2, 1998, the quotes are only indicative. 5 The quoted bid and ask spread at close (3 pm) averages 7.5 yield basis points.
When a security is reopened, bid and ask quotes are available both before and after the auction. In these cases (38 auctions), we use a simple average of bid and ask quotes at close on the auction day as an estimate of the true secondary market yield. Since transactions are executed on both bid and ask quotes, the average transaction yield will take place at the midpoint. This measure was also recommended to us by practitioners. The data is provided by the Oslo Stock
Exchange. In addition to bid and ask quotes, the data also includes information on secondary market transactions. Unfortunately, the bidders report the auction awards as ordinary secondary market transactions. It is thus difficult to separate the secondary market transactions from auction awards. However, the data verifies that almost all transactions are executed at the bid or the ask, or within the bid and ask spread.
When a new T-bill is auctioned there is no active secondary market at the auction day. This is the case for 30 auctions. Trading starts after the settlement, which is two days after the auction. In these cases, we measure secondary market yields similar to Hamao and Jegadeesh (1998) :
where i t is the estimated secondary market yield at the auction day, while i t+τ is the observed secondary market yield (average of bid and ask quotes) at the first day with active trading (close) in the auctioned security, and i c t+τ and i c t are the (duration weighted) average of observed secondary market yields of two control bills/bonds (close). We use one control bill/bond with longer duration than the auctioned T-bill and one with shorter duration than the auctioned security. The change in the control bills/bonds represents general market movements between the auction day and the first day with trading in the new security. An example is provided in Appendix A. Appendix A also shows how secondary market yields are converted into prices.
An alternative method of estimating the true secondary market yield, is to intrapolate the yield curve on the auction day. Two advantages with the selected method are that (i) it is simple, and (ii) that we only need to assume that the shape of the yield curve does not change until trading in the auctioned securities starts.
Auction theory and empirical implications
This section reviews theoretical results on multiple unit auctions, with an emphasis on empirical predictions of the theory. In multiple unit auctions, many identical units are put up for sale at the same time. The bidders submit demand schedules consisting of price and quantity. In Section 5, the empirical predictions are tested using our data.
Auctions of Treasury securities are often referred to as common value auctions. In these auctions, all bidders ex-post place the same value on the object. Ex-ante this value is unknown to the bidders. In Treasury auctions, the common value would equal the secondary market price after the auction.
Below, we focus on two theories of bidder behavior in common value auctions; the winner's curse and risk aversion. A third, but unlikely explanation of bidder behavior in Treasury auctions, is that bidders place independent private values on the object for sale. This explanation is hard to justify because securities can be resold in the post-auction secondary market. However, as long as the secondary market is less than perfectly liquid, there may exist a private component to bidder valuations. The auction theory will be presented in light of the bidders three choice variables: at which prices they bid, how much they disperse their bids, and how much they bid for.
The winner's curse
The existence of private information on the common valuation gives rise to the winner's curse problem in common value auctions. Bikchandani and Huang (1993) suggest two sources of private information in Treasury auctions. First, dealers have their own forecasts of changes in the term structure of interest rates. Second, and perhaps more important, is that dealers can see their own customer order flows since non-dealers must bid through a dealer. The winner's curse arises because winning bidders of auctions are those with the highest ex ante estimates.
Even if each bidder obtains an unbiased estimate of the object being sold before bid submission, winning conveys bad news to bidders because it means that all other bidders estimate the value of the object to be lower. As a result, when the potential for the winner's curse is higher, bidders will bid more cautiously.
The potential for the winner's curse increases with uncertainty. The less precise bidders' signals are, the higher the likelihood of suffering the winner's curse. Increased uncertainty also leads to decreased competition because the probability that another bidder's valuation is just below a given bidder's valuation is less. Hence, bidders can lower their bids without significantly decreasing their probabilities of winning.
The potential for the winner's curse also increases with the number of bidders. When the number of bidders increases, competition is harder, and the probability that another bidder's valuation is just below a given bidder's valuation increases. However, when the number of competing bidders increases the difference between the unconditioned expectation and the expectation conditioned on winning gets larger. This effect of increased winner's curse is stronger than the effect of increased competition. Therefore, bidders must shade their bids more when the number of bidders increases. 6
The first bidding variable we consider is at which price level the bidders will submit bids.
This is the only bidding variable in a single unit auction since these auctions are for only one unit. In multiple unit auctions, the bidders can employ richer strategies since they also can disperse their bids and decide how much to bid for. Ausubel (1997) shows that the winner's curse is more nuanced in multiple unit auctions than in single unit auctions. He refers to this as the "champions plague". In a multiple unit auction with interdependent values, a bidder's expected value conditional on winning more objects is less than the expected value conditional on winning fewer objects. As long as individual bidders demand less than the auctioned supply or submit downward sloping demand schedules, bidders can adjust for the "champions plague"
by reducing quantity at a given price. This argument relies on that individual bidders demand less than the auctioned supply, or submit downward sloping demand schedules. The quantity restriction is not met in Norwegian T-bill auctions. However, the bidders submit downward sloping demand schedules. 7
The next bidding variable we consider is how much to disperse the bids. If a bidder disperses his bids, he will win at lower prices when demand is weaker than expected, and conversely, he will win at higher prices when demand is stronger than expected. When the stop-out price is high, other bidders have information that the secondary market price will be high, and the bidder would like to revise his bids upward to win more units. If the stop-out price is low, the bidder would like to revise his bids downward to win fewer units. With multiple bidding, the bidder's outcome will be more closely aligned to the aggregate outcome of the auction. Thus, we expect that the dispersion of bids will increase with the potential winner's curse. This means that we expect bid dispersion to increase with uncertainty and the number of bidders.
Finally, a bidder can also respond to increased potential for the winner's curse by changing the volume demanded. The "champion's plague" implies that when there is a reservation price, a bidder would reduce his overall demand when the winner's curse increases. In the absence of a reservation price, bidders will always have an incentive to submit bids at very low prices.
From the results of Ausubel (1997) the magnitude of adjustment for the "champions plague" is unclear. Solving for equilibria in multiple unit common value auctions is analytically in-tractable. However, there is some theoretical support in Wilson (1979) that, in equilibrium, the adjustment for the "champions plague" increases with the potential for winner's curse. In his model, the object for sale is assumed to be perfectly divisible, while bidders submit continuous demand schedules. The model is analytically intractable, however Wilson solves two examples.
In one of the examples, he shows that bid dispersion increases with the number of bidders. 8
Risk aversion
Risk aversion may also explain bidding behavior in Treasury auctions. Wang and Zender (1998) analyze common value multiple unit auctions where bidders have private information and are risk averse. They derive an Euler equation by restricting the allowable demand curves to be downward sloping. However, they solve the Euler equation only under the assumption that bidders have no private information. In discriminatory price auctions, when a reserve price of zero is imposed, only a single equilibrium is left.
In the Wang and Zender model exogenous supply uncertainty is motivated by the existence of non-competitive bids that generate uncertainty in the stop-out price when there is no private information. Their model predicts that risk averse bidders shade and disperse their bids more when uncertainty is high or when auction size is large, while they shade and disperse their bids less when the number of bidders increases. 9 Auction size is important since more aggregate security risk must be shared among the bidders when auction size is large. Similarly, when there are more bidders there are also more agents to bear the aggregate security risk.
Gordy (1996) models a discriminatory price auction of two identical units where the sets of possible signals and of permitted bids are restricted to be finite. In this model, it is private information and not exogenous supply uncertainty that generates uncertainty about the stopout price. By numerical calculations, he shows that risk averse bidders disperse their bids more when uncertainty increases. Scott and Wolf (1979) present a non-equilibrium model where each bidder, who is assumed to be risk averse, forms probability distributions over the auction stopout price and the post auction secondary market price. The bidders select portfolios of bids much as a risk averse investor forms a portfolio of risky securities. Hence, risk averse bidders will typically disperse their bids. Compared with standard auction models, their model differs in that bidders do not consider the effect of their own strategies on the stop-out price.
Empirical implications and literature
Results in Nyborg et al. (2001) and Gordy (1999) suggest that the winner's curse/"champions plague" may be more important than risk aversion in explaining bidding behavior in discriminatory price auctions. Nyborg et al. (2001) show that bid shading and intra-bidder dispersion increases with uncertainty consistent with both the winner's curse and risk aversion. The lack of a significant positive relationship between bid shading and auction size is interpreted in favor of the winner's curse. 10 In their sample, the variation in the number of bidders is small. Hence, they are not able to test the effect of increased competition. Gordy (1999) shows that intrabidder dispersion increases with the number of bidders in Portuguese T-bill auctions consistent with the winner's curse. However, the secondary market is very thin. Secondary market interest rates are estimated from available observations in the T-bill market and in the interbank money market. This suggests that the private component in valuations may be important. 11,12
Empirical results from other markets and auction settings are inconclusive with respect to bidders' adjustment for the winner's curse. Brannman et al. (1987) examine the effect of an increased number of bidders. If bidders understand and adjust for the winner's curse, winning bids should increase in inverse proportion to the number of bidders. If they fail to understand the winner's curse, winning bids will increase with the maximum order statistics. They find that maximum order statistics give better fit in most cases using samples from five different auction settings. In a study of oil and gas leases, Hendricks et al. (1987) find support for adjustment by bidders for the winner's curse. However, they also find that some bidders would have earned significantly higher profits if they had reduced their bids by a constant, holding all competing 10 Although the coefficient is economically small, there is a positive relationship between intra-bidder dispersion and auction size. This result may be interpreted in favor of risk aversion.
11 The Portuguese T-bill auctions are not pure discriminatory price auctions as in Norway. Banko de Portugal may increase the supply by an additional session after the auction. In this session bids are awarded at the quantity weighted winning bid yield. Awarded winners in the auction are given preference. Another difference from the Norwegian T-bill auctions is that a strict reserve price policy is used by Banko de Portugal. The reserve price is strictly binding in a large number of the Portuguese T-bill auctions.
12 Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) show that in private value auctions, (risk neutral) bidders would in general submit downward sloping demand schedules. It is also likely that private values could induce an association between the number of bidders and the use of multiple bids (Gordy, 1999) . Gordy (1999) uses the following example to illustrate this. Assume a pure private value auction of two identical units. A bidder has a value v1 and v2 on the two units, and uses a simple multiplicative discount rule to form his bids, b1 = cv1 and b2 = cv2. If competition increases, c must increase toward one. Thus, the spread between the two bids must also increase.
bids constant.
Results
In this section, we test the empirical implications from the theoretical survey. We particularly examine how bidders respond to an increased number of bidders, controlling for market volatility and auction size.
We use similar measures on bidding variables and auction outcome as in Nyborg et al. (2001) .
We also use similar measures for market volatility and auction size. Hence, in this sense our results are directly comparable to theirs. However, they were not able to test the effects of an increased number of bidders since there is almost no variation in the number of bidders in their sample. Before presenting our regression results (subsections 5.2 and 5.3), we start with reporting some summary statistics (subsection 5.1). Table 2 presents summary statistics. The discount, intra-bidder dispersion and quantity demanded describe each bidder's bidding variables. The auction outcome is measured by the auction revenue and award concentration. There are also summary statistics on three explanatory variables; volatility, auction size and the number of bidders. When presenting our results, all prices are expressed as percentage of face value.
Descriptive statistics
Five bids are deleted. All deleted bids were submitted in the same auction, and were roughly 100 basis yield points higher than all other bids. These bids are unserious or represent typing errors. However, the results are not very sensitive to whether these bids are included or not.
Following Nyborg et al. (2001) , we start with defining the discount for bidder i in auction j as
where P j is the secondary market price after the auction results are released, while (p ij ) is the quantity weighted average bid. The discount measures how much the bidder shades his bids relative to the post auction price.
To measure to what extent a bidder disperses his bids, we use intra-bidder dispersion, which is the quantity-weighted standard deviation of bidder i's bids in auction j. Individual bid quantity by bidder i in auction j (q ij ), is measured as the quantity demanded by bidder i as a fraction of the supplied quantity.
To examine the auction outcome we use two different measures, the revenue and award concentration. In order to measure revenue (seller's loss) by participating in auction j (π j ), we take the difference between the secondary market price after the auction and the quantity weighted average winning bid price. This measure differs from the discount since we use only winning bids, while in measuring the discount we use both winning and loosing bids. It is also similar to the revenue measure used in other studies, for instance Cammack (1991), Spindt and Stolz (1992) , Simon (1994) and Gordy (1999) . The second performance measure is award concentration (C j ) which measures the fraction of awards to the five highest individual bids in auction j.
The explanatory variables are volatility, auction size and the number of bidders. Volatility is measured using a GARCH(1,1) model (see Appendix B). It is the forecasted one-day standard deviation of the auctioned T-bill. Auction size is the issued quantity measured in NOK billion.
The number of bidders equals the number of bidders who submitted at least one bid in the auction.
In Table 2 the exogenous variables are presented in the left-hand section, the bidding variables are presented in the middle section, while the performance variables are presented in the righthand section. We have also included some averages for Swedish T-bill auctions, taken from Nyborg et al. (2001) , to make comparisons possible. We do not include their averages for discount and revenue since they measure the secondary market price at the bid, while we use an average of bid and ask prices.
First, consider the exogenous variables. The average standard deviation (volatility) is 0.039 per cent of face value or roughly four basis points, which is only a fourth of the Swedish average (Nyborg et al., 2001) . In fact, the highest forecast for standard deviation is less than the Swedish average. This finding is explained by the very high interest rate volatility during the sample period of the Swedish study, especially in 1992. The average auction size is NOK 4.1 billion, varying between NOK 2 billion and NOK 12 billion. The average number of bidders is 13. The number of bidders varies between 6 and 22.
Next, consider the bidding variables. The average discount is 0.075 per cent of face value. Volatility is forecasted by a GARCH (1,1) model. Volatility is the daily standard deviation in T-bill returns (%), size is the issue size in NOK billion, and No. of bidders is the realized number of bidders. Discount, intrabidder dispersion (intra-disp) and profit are measured as per cent of face value (NOK 100). Discount is measured as the secondary market price (simple average of bid and ask prices) minus the quantity weighted bid price. Profit is measured as the secondary market price minus the quantity weighted winning bid price. Quantity is the demanded quantity divided by supply. Award concentration is the fraction awarded to the five highest bids. Sweden is the simple average calculated from three duration bands (0.25, 0.5 and 1 year) in Nyborg et al. (1999) .
The discounts varies considerably. The highest discount is about eight standard deviations away from the mean, while the lowest is about three standard deviations away. Note that the size of the discount depends on how the secondary market price is measured. The average bid-ask spread is 0.048 of face value. Thus, the average discount measured at the bid is NOK 0.051 per cent of face value, while the average discount measured at the ask is 0.099 per cent of face value.
In Nyborg et al. (2001) the average discount measured at the bid is 0.020 per cent of face value, which is less than half the size of the Norwegian discount when measured at the bid. This is surprising considering the high interest rate volatility in the Swedish sample.
The average intra-bidder dispersion is 0.022 per cent of face value. Hence, bidders typically disperse their bids. The smallest intra-bidder dispersion is zero, indicating that the bidder submits only a single bid. The highest intra-bidder dispersion is twelve standard deviations away from the mean.
The average demand as a proportion of supply is 21.4 per cent. The largest demand is 163%, that is, the bidder bids for more than supply. This strategy may be motivated by the auction rules. Bids at the cut off price are awarded on a pro rata basis. By submitting bids with large demand, a bidder may capture a large proportion of demand on a pro rata basis. Note that the median demand is only half the size of the average demand. This means that most demand schedules are for quantities less than the average, while some demand schedules with very large quantities increase the average.
Finally, we consider the performance variables. Average revenue measured in NOK per face value is 0.036 per cent. The average is significantly different from zero (t-value is 6.1). The profit varies between -0.043 and 0.246 per cent of face value. The highest number is four standard deviations away from the mean, while the lowest number is less than two standard deviations from the mean. If we measure the revenue at the bid, the average profit is 0.012 per cent of face value. Also this number is statistically greater than zero (t-value is 2.4). In Nyborg et al. (2001) the average revenue measured at the bid is negative, -0.005 per cent of face value. This is not surprising considering that the bidders in the Swedish T-bill auctions shade their bids much less than the bidders in the Norwegian T-bill auctions.
The average award concentration is 0.315, meaning that the five highest bids are awarded roughly one-third of the securities. There is considerable variation in the award concentration.
The highest number equals 1, indicating that all the securities are awarded to the five highest bids. The lowest number is 0.010 which means that only one per cent of the securities are awarded to the five highest bids.
Results from regression analysis
In the regressions the dependent variables are discount, intra-bidder dispersion, quantity, profit and award concentration. The explanatory variables are volatility, new·volatility, auction size and the number of bidders. Both volatility and new·volatility are measures of uncertainty.
New·volatility is a multiplicative dummy where New equals one if a new security is auctioned and zero otherwise. This dummy will capture greater reactions to secondary market volatility when a new security is auctioned. From the winner's curse hypothesis, we expect that increased uncertainty (volatility and new·volatility) and an increased number of bidders would lead to more bid shading and bid dispersion, and less quantity demanded. The risk aversion hypothesis also predicts that bid shading and bid dispersion increases with uncertainty. Unlike the winner's curse hypothesis, risk aversion predicts a positive relationship between auction size and bid shading and dispersion, and a negative relationship between bid shading and the number of bidders. In the regression equations including prices (discount, intra-bidder dispersion and profit), heteroscedastisty can be related to volatility. These regressions are weighted with volatility. The two remaining regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares (quantity and award concentration). Similar to Nyborg et al. (2001) , each equation is estimated separately as opposed to joint estimation in a system. The explanation for this is that there is a lack of theory, which imposes constraints on the estimation. in an increase in the discount of the same magnitude. Since the standard deviation of volatility is 0.022 per cent of face value, volatility has an economically significant impact on discounts.
The effect of increased volatility on discount is particularly strong in auctions of new securities.
In these auctions, the reaction to volatility almost doubles. Thus, a one percentage increase in volatility will, on average, lead to almost two percentage increase in the discount. The coefficient on size is insignificant. This finding suggests that demand in auctions is highly elastic. The coefficient on the number of bidders is positive and statistically significant. On average, the discount increases by 0.029 per cent of face value when the number of bidders increases by ten.
In the regression with intra-bidder dispersion as dependent variable, we see that intra-bidder dispersion increases with volatility. An increase in volatility by one standard deviation (0.022 per cent of face value) tends to result in an increase in dispersion by 0.004 per cent of face value.
When a new security is auctioned the effect of increased market volatility more than doubles.
Compared with the average intra-bidder dispersion of 0.022 per cent, the effect of increased uncertainty is economically significant. The coefficient on size is negative and significant. However, the coefficient is economically small. An increase in auction supply by one billion would not decrease intra-bidder dispersion by more than 0.0008 per cent. The coefficient on the number of bidders is positive and statistically significant. When the number of bidders increases by ten, intra-bidder dispersion on average increases with 0.011 per cent of face value. This number is economically significant.
Consider the regression using quantity demanded as a proportion of supply. There is no significant relationship between relative demand and volatility in reopenings. However, there is a significant negative relationship between market volatility and relative demand when a new security is issued. The coefficient on size is negative, but not significant at the five per cent level.
The coefficient on the number of bidders is highly significant, both statistically and economically.
When the number of bidders increases with one, the relative demand decreases by 1.2 per cent.
Finally, we turn to the performance regressions. In the profit regression, we see that profits increase significantly with uncertainty. Again, the effect of increased volatility is much higher in auctions of new securities. In these auctions, an increase in volatility by one standard deviation (0.022 per cent) would, on average, increase auction profits by 0.028 per cent of face value.
Compared with an average revenue of 0.036 per cent of face value, the effect of increased volatility is economically significant. Size does not seem to have any effects on bidder profits. The coefficient on the number of bidders is positive, but not significant at the five per cent level.
In the regression with award concentration, there is no significant relationship between award concentration and uncertainty. However, award concentration tends to fall when the auction size or the number of bidders increase. An increase in auction size by one billion tends to reduce the award concentration by 3.66 per cent, while an increase in the number of bidders by one tends to decrease award concentration by 1.97 per cent. Discount, intra-bidder dispersion and profit are measured as per cent of face value (NOK 100). Quantity equals demanded quantity divided by supply, while award concentration equals the fraction awarded to the five highest bids. Volatility is the standard deviation in daily returns (%), size is the auctioned quantity in NOK billion, no. of bidders is the realized number of bidders, and New·Volatility is a multiplicative dummy which equals volatility if a new security is auctioned and zero otherwise. The discount, intra-bidder dispersion and profit regressions are weighted by volatility. The coefficients are estimated by ordinary least squares. Adj. R 2 is from the unweighted regressions. Obs. is the number of observations.
t-values are reported below the coefficients. * indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
In the regressions presented in Table 3 , we used the realized number of bidders. However, bidders base their bidding decisions on expected values. Only registered dealers are allowed to submit bids. Bidders may learn ex ante from communication with other dealers before the auction which dealers will be participating. Only in this case, ex-ante expectations are similar to realized values. We estimated an ARMAX(1,1) model to generate expectations on bidder participation. Using the generated expectations instead of realized values did not alter any of the results significantly (see Appendix C).
We also performed other robustness checks. First, we ran all regressions using data only for reopenings. In these auctions, secondary market prices are available on the auction day. Possible measurement errors from estimating secondary market prices are thus avoided. Second, we ran the discount and profit regressions using secondary bid or ask prices rather than an average.
Third, we estimated all the bidding regressions with bidder specific dummies to capture fixed effects. 14 The results were not significantly altered in any of these regressions.
To summarize, our results are broadly consistent with results in Nyborg et al. (2001) . Bidders respond to increased uncertainty by shading and dispersing their bids more. Auction size appears not to affect the discount, and has only a small (and negative) impact on intra-bidder dispersion. 15 Strong evidence in favor of winner's curse or "champions plague" comes from the results on the number of bidders. Bidders respond to an increased number of bidders by shading and dispersing their bids more, and by reducing the quantity demanded. Table 4 provides further evidences that winner's curse or "champions plague" may be important. For winner's curse to be important, the higher bidders must be awarded more than lower bidders. First, we calculate each bidder's quantity weighted bid level in each auction. Next, we order the bids from the highest to the lowest. At each price level we compute the ratio of award over demand. The average ratios are reported in Table 4 . A number close to one means that the bidder is almost awarded in full. The highest bidder is, on average, awarded almost 90 per cent of demand in T-bill auctions. The second highest bidder is awarded about 80 per cent of demand etc. The lowest bidder is awarded less than 10 per cent of demand. We see that bidders to some extent can hedge the winner's curse by submitting more bids. The correlation between the ratio of award over demand and the number of bids is -0.454 for the highest bidder. 16 However, it is clear that the higher bidders must consider the potential for winner's curse. Next, we order the bidders from the highest p n to lowest p 1 in each auction.
Award/demand calculates the proportion of demand awarded.
Correlation with number of bids is the correlation between Award/demand and the number of bids submitted by the bidder. All correlations above 0.235 are significant at the five per cent level.
Bidder types
In this section we use our knowledge of bidder identities to shed more light on how different bidders bid in the auctions. More specifically, we want to examine differences between large, medium-sized and small bidders.
In Figure 2 we divided the bidders into three types based on their total purchases. Our motivation for separating bidders by total purchases comes from Bikchandani and Huang (1993) .
They claim that the most important source of private information is knowledge of order flows.
The existence of private information is documented in the previous section. Since large bidders tend to see more order flow through customer bids, they may be better informed than smaller bidders.
Due to the complexity of analyzing multiple unit auctions, there is a lack of theoretical models which allow non-symmetry among bidders. Single unit common value auctions are analytically more tractable. Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) model a first price common value auction where the estimates of a subset of uninformed bidders are less precise than the estimates of their informed competitors. Uninformed bidders are more likely to earn negative profits when their informed competitors abstain from bidding or underbid relative to winning bids. If uninformed bidders solely bid on the basis of public information, they earn zero expected profits, while informed bidders earn positive expected profits. Umlauf (1993) shows that, on average, large bidders earned larger profits than smaller bidders in the discriminatory price auctions of T-bills in Mexico in the time period 1986-1990. Type 3 bidders participate in only 10 auctions. Award ratio is total purchases over total demand.
Consider the bidding variables. There are no significant differences in discounts across the bidder types. The numbers are thus not very different from the average for all bidders presented in Table 2 (NOK 0.075 per cent of face value). However, Type 1 bidders disperse their bids more than Type 2 bidders, which again disperse their bids more than Type 3 bidders. This suggests a relationship between bidder size and dispersion of bids. This is also reflected in the number of bids submitted by each bidder type. Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3 bidders submit, on average, 7.5 bids, 4.1 bids and 2.2 bids, respectively. Quantity demanded differs across bidder types by construction. Typically, Type 1 bidders demand 38 per cent of supply, Type 2 bidders demand 14 per cent of supply, while Type 3 bidders demand only 2 per cent of supply.
Next, we turn to the performance variables. There are no significant differences in profit between bidder types. On average, bidders earn close to NOK 0.04 per cent of face value. This result is contrary to the result in Umlauf (1993) . 17 The award ratios are also roughly similar across bidder types. On average, 40 per cent of demand is awarded.
Next, we run similar regressions as in Table 3 separately for each bidder type. 18 We will focus on the effects of changes in supply and in the number of bidders. Table 7 verifies that increased uncertainty has the same effects for all bidder types as in Table 3 .
Consider the discount regressions. Increased supply leads to less bid shading for Type 1 bidders and to more bid shading for Type 3 bidders. On average, an increase in auction supply by one billion would decrease the discount by 0.0027 per cent of face value for Type 1 bidders, while a similar increase in supply would tend to increase the discount by 0.0037 per cent of face value for Type 3 bidders. All bidder types tend to increase bid shading when the number of 17 Although the average profits per NOK invested are similar across bidder types in Norwegian T-bill auctions, Type 1 bidders could earn more per NOK invested if they were awarded more securities in the most profitable auctions. Results (not shown here) show that this is not the case.
18 The regression with award concentration is impossible to run for each bidder type. Discount, intra-bidder dispersion and profit are measured as per cent of face value (NOK 100). Quantity equals demanded quantity divided by supply, while award ratio is total demand over total purchases. Auctions is the average number of auctions where the participants in the group participated. Thus, max. corresponds to the number of auctions where the most active bidder participated, while min. corresponds to the number of auctions where the least active bidder participated. Obs. is the number of observations. Type 1 is the group consisting of the five bidders who bought (or demanded) most securities in the auctions. Type 2 is the group consisting of the 6-20 most active bidders (purchase or demand), while Type 3 consists of the smallest bidders. This group consists of 12 bidders. Discount, intra-bidder dispersion and profit are measured as per cent of face value (NOK 100). Quantity equals demanded quantity divided by supply, while award ratio is total demand over total purchases. Quantity will differ across bidder types by construction. The test statistic for Discount is calculated using average discounts for each auction. The numbers are the p-value from two-tailed t-tests. * indicates significance at the five per cent level.
bidders increases. However, it is the largest bidders who make the largest adjustment. When the number of bidders increases by ten, Type 1 bidders tend to increase the discount by 0.042 per cent of face value. This number is economically significant.
In the regression with intra-bidder dispersion as dependent variable, we see that intra-bidder dispersion decreases with auction size for Type 1 and Type 2 bidders, while the coefficient is insignificant for Type 3 bidders. All bidder types respond to an increased number of bidders by dispersing their bids more. Again, the effect is strongest for Type 1 bidders. They tend to increase dispersion by 0.019 per cent of face value when the number of bidders increases with ten, while Type 2 bidders would increase dispersion by 0.13 per cent of face value. 19
In the quantity regression there is a difference between Type 1 bidders on the one hand, and Type 2 and Type 3 bidders on the other hand. Type 1 bidders tend to reduce relative demand by 13.5 per cent when the number of bidders increases by ten. This is a large number. On average, Type 2 and Type 3 bidders reduce relative demand when auction size increases.
Finally, consider the profit regressions. The large degree of bid shading by Type 1 bidders as a response to increased participation, causes profits to increase with the number of bidders.
Typically, an increase in the number of bidders by ten, would increase profits by 0.015 per cent of face value. For Type 3 bidders, profits tend to increase with auction size. When supply increases by one billion, profits tend to increase by 0.0035 per cent of face value. We find no significant effect of increased supply or participation for Type 2 bidders.
The results suggest that Type 1 bidders tend to adjust more for the winner's curse than Type 2 and Type 3 bidders. This is not consistent with the hypothesis that large bidders are better informed than smaller bidders. If Type 1 bidders were better informed, we would expect that they made smaller adjustments for the winner's curse/"champions plague" than Type 2
and Type 3 bidders. However, large bidders must consider the possibility of being the only winner, or one of very few winners. For instance, if a large bidder bids for a quantity similar to the auction size at a single price, he will win all awards if his bid is the highest. In contrast, if a small bidder wins, it is more likely that he is one of many winners. The negative information implied in winning is worse when you are the only winner rather than one of many winners.
This intuition may explain why large bidders tend to adjust more in response increased winner's curse/"champions plague" than smaller bidders. 20 The results in Table 7 also suggest that risk aversion may be important for Type 3 bidders since discounts and profits increase with auction supply. Discount, intra-bidder dispersion and profit are measured as per cent of face value (NOK 100). Quantity equals demanded quantity divided by supply. Volatility is the standard deviation in daily returns (%), size is the auctioned quantity in NOK billion, No. of bidders is the realized number of bidders, and New·Volatility is a multiplicative dummy which equals volatility if a new security is auctioned and zero otherwise. The discount, intra-bidder dispersion and profit regressions are weighted by volatility. The coefficients are estimated by ordinary least squares. Adj. R 2 is from the unweighted regressions. Obs. is the number of observations. t-values are reported below the coefficients. * indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. Type 1 is the group consisting of the five bidders who bought (or demanded) most securities in the auctions. Type 2 is the group consisting of the 6-20 most active bidders (purchase or demand), while Type 3 consists of the smallest bidders. This group consists of 12 bidders.
20 It is also possible that Type 2 and Type 3 bidders are more likely to participate when they have private information. When they have no access to private information they abstain from bidding. An alternative to the winner's curse/"champions plague" explanation is collusion among the largest bidders. This explanation is considered as less likely. It is hard to see why collusion should be related to uncertainty, auction size and the number of bidders as suggested by Table 7 . Such behavior would give an incentive for other bidders to participate in the auctions on a more frequent basis and thus reduce profits to the large bidders.
Conclusions
This paper studies bidder behavior using a very detailed data set consisting of actual bid distributions in Norwegian Treasury bill auctions held during [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . A main result is that bidders respond to an increased number of bidders by dispersing their bids more and reducing the price level at which they bid, and by reducing the quantity demanded. The results are consistent with an adjustment for the winner's curse/"champions plague", thus supporting evidences in Nyborg et al. (2001) and Gordy (1999) .
Results also suggest that bidders respond much stronger to increased uncertainty in auctions of new securities than in reopenings. Hence, auctions of new securities are more expensive for the Treasury than reopenings. On average, the total return to dealers who bought securities in the auction was NOK 146500 per NOK billion in reopenings and NOK 635500 per NOK billion in auctions of new securities.
There are no significant differences in bid shading and bidder profits between large, mediumsized and small dealers. Thus, if information asymmetries exist, bidders are not able to exploit these asymmetries to earn more per NOK invested. All bidder types make adjustment for the winner's curse/"champions plague". However, there are some evidence that bidder behavior differs across bidder types. Large bidders tend to make the largest adjustments for the winner's curse/"champions plague". Results also suggest that the smallest bidders bid less aggressive when auction size increases. This finding indicates that these bidders may also be risk averse.
The intuition of multiple bidding as a hedging tool to protect against the winner's curse/"champions plague" has empirical support. However, in the literature no equilibrium is demonstrated where bidders disperse their bids when there are no quantity restrictions. Theoretical analysis of multiple unit auctions are complex, but is a research area in progress. Hopefully, these empirical results can provide useful guidance for further research.
A Calculation of Secondary Market Yields/Prices
To estimate secondary market yields when a new security is auctioned, we use the following expression:
where i t is the estimated secondary market yield at the auction day, while i t+τ is the observed secondary market yield (average of bid and ask quotes) at the first day with active trading (close) in the auctioned security, and i c t+τ and i c t are the (duration weighted) average of observed secondary market yields of two control bills/bonds (close). Table 8 provides an example from the auction on July 7, 1997. The duration is calculated on the auction day. July 10 is the first day with active trading in the new T-bill. All yields are measured at close (3 pm).
Using the information presented in the table, we illustrate how secondary market yields are estimated when a new T-bill is auctioned. First, we find the simple average of bid and ask yields for the auctioned security on the first day with active trading: i t+τ = Next, we convert the yield into price.
where P is price, R is interest paid at maturity, i is the yield. N is the number of days to maturity, A is the number of days since the issue, while C is the coupon. Settlement for the auctioned T-bill is July 9, and the coupon rate is 4 per cent. The T-bill matures at June 17, 1998. Thus, the price can be calculated as follows:
The last term equals zero since it is a new security which is issued.
B GARCH(1,1) model
To estimate the conditional volatility we use a GARCH(1,1) model. Let P t be the price of the T-bill index, while k is the number of days between two observations. First, we estimate
Data for different T-bills are pooled. We include index series on T-bills with 90, 180 and 360 days to maturity for the period 1993-1998. In addition to lagged forecast variance ( σ 2 t−1 ) and the squared residual from the previous period (e 2 t−1 ), we also include duration (Duration t ) and the number of days between two observations (k) as volatility regressors. The volatility is expected to increase with duration. The volatility forecast is given by
The model is estimated with maximum likelihood. The estimated coefficients and associated standard errors are reported in Table 9 . Next, we use the model to generate volatility forecasts by inserting for e 2 t−1 , σ 2 t−1 , Duration t and k. We calculate volatility by taking the weighted average of the volatility of the index series to fit the duration of the auctioned securities. For instance, if a T-bill with duration of 0.75 years is auctioned, we estimate the volatility by weighting 50 per cent of the estimated volatility for the index with duration of 0.5 years and 50 per cent of the estimated volatility of the index with duration of one year. To calculate duration of the auctioned T-bill, we use the quantity weighted average winning bid price.
C Expected number of bidders
To generate expectation on the number of bidders we use an ARMAX(1,1) model with duration and auction size as explanatory variables. Participation is expected to increase with the issue size. Gordy (1999) offers two alternative explanations. First, larger issue size will, ceteris paribus, increase the probability of winning at any given price and thus reduces the negative information implied in winning (winner's curse). Second, the Government may want to increase the issue size when it perceives demand to be high. Both explanations indicate that there should be positive correlation between auction size and the number of bidders. We also open for a relationship between duration and bidder participation. Such a relationship may exist if dealers or the investors who bid through the dealers have preferences for specific durations.
21 The estimated coefficients are presented in Table 10 .
All coefficients are statistically significant. An increase in duration with one year would, on average, increase bidder participation by almost four. Also bidder participation tends to increase with auction size as expected. A two billion increase in auction size tends to increase the bidder participation by one. Both the autocorrelation part and the moving average part are highly significant. This model was used to make one-step ahead forecasts of bidder participation. Tables 11 and 12 present the results with the forecasted bidder participation. The tables show that results are broadly consistent with those presented earlier. Discount, intra-bidder dispersion and profit are measured as per cent of face value (NOK 100). Quantity equals demanded quantity divided by supply, while award concentration is the fraction awarded to the five highest bids. Volatility is the standard deviation in daily returns, size is the auctioned quantity in NOK billion, Pred. no of bidders is the expected number of bidders, and New·Volatility is a multiplicative dummy which equals volatility if a new security is auctioned and zero otherwise. The discount, intra-bidder dispersion and profit regressions are weighted by volatility. The coefficients are estimated by ordinary least squares. Adj. R 2 is from the unweighted regressions. Obs. is the number of observations.
t-values are reported below the coefficients. * indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. Discount, intra-bidder dispersion and profit are measured as per cent of face value (NOK 100). Quantity equals demanded quantity divided by supply. Volatility is the standard deviation in daily returns, size is the auctioned quantity in NOK billion, no. of bidders is the predicted number of bidders, and New·Volatility is a multiplicative dummy which equals volatility if a new security is auctioned and zero otherwise. The discount, intra-bidder dispersion and profit regressions are weighted by volatility. The coefficients are estimated by ordinary least squares. Adj. R 2 is from the unweighted regressions. Obs. is the number of observations. t-values are reported below the coefficients. * indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. Type 1 is the group consisting of the five bidders who bought (or demanded) most securities in the auctions. Type 2 is the group consisting of the 6-20 most active bidders (purchase or demand), while Type 3 consists of the smallest bidders. This group consists of 12 bidders.
